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ABSTRACT. Early decision admission programs -which allow a student to receive early
notification of admission in return for a commitment to attend a particular institution- enjoyed
explosive popularity at America's institutions of higher education in the 199os. Schools use the
programs to stabilize class size and identify enthusiastic applicants. The programs, however,
favor students who are wealthier and whiter than their regular decision classmates. This Note
applies civil rights and antitrust principles to discuss serious legal concerns raised by early
decision programs.
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INTRODUCTION
A 2003 study of students at Harvard, Princeton, MIT, and Yale found that,
"among those students for whom financial aid was not a concern," seventy-
eight percent used early admission programs to apply to college; among
students for whom "financial aid was important to their choice of college, only
48.0 percent applied early."' That finding, and others like it, has sharpened a
debate over college early admission programs in general, and early decision
programs-which require applicants to a given university to enroll there if
admitted early-in particular. On one side of the debate are those who argue
that early admission programs offer significant benefits to both institutions
and students, stabilizing enrollment levels while providing students a way of
indicating their first-choice school.' On the other side are those who feel, in the
words of one counselor, that early admission programs "serve the institutional
needs of colleges a great deal more than [they] serve students."3 While the
schools benefit from the programs, the programs push the college search
process earlier and earlier into students' high school careers. Students now
begin the college admissions process -historically largely confined to a
student's senior year - as early as freshman or sophomore year.
Beyond sharpening this debate over students' general well-being,4 the
release of the Avery study in 2003 expanded the incipient debate' over the
impact of early admission programs on the rate at which poor and minority
students are admitted to universities. As Bruce Poch, Dean of Admissions at
1. CHRISTOPHER AVERYET AL., THE EARLYADMISSIONS GAME 59 (2003).
2. See, e.g., William T. Conley, Early Decision Is Good Option, USA TODAY, Aug. 6, 2003, at
Alo; Mary Haile, Early Decision Numbers Plunge at Dartmouth, DARTMOUTH, Jan. 6, 2005,
LEXIS, News & Bus., Univ. Wire File (quoting Dartmouth Dean of Admissions Karl
Furstenberg that early decision works well because "[t]here are many students who know
that Dartmouth is their first choice, and we also have a value of making and sticking to
commitments").
3. Eric Hoover, New Attacks on Early Decision, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 11, 2002, at A45
(quoting H. Boggs Wright, Director of Guidance, McLean High School, McLean, Virginia).
4. Id. (quoting Wright as stating that "[w]hen you're deciding where to go to college, it's
important to have a period of reflection. An extra six months may not seem like a long time
to an adult, but for a high-school kid, it's an eternity."); see also AVERY ET AL., supra note 1, at
3 (quoting Larry Momo, the former admissions director at Columbia University, arguing
that "(t]his getting-to-colleges early disease of the 9o's is producing a high school culture
that is destroying the simplicity and repose of adolescence with its carefree spirit, idyllic
visions, its ease and frivolity; replacing them with mindless overwork, cynical maneuvering,
constant anxiety, and the sleep that does not refresh").
s. See, e.g., Nicholas Thompson, Early Admissions Seen as Tilted to the Affluent, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 24, 2001, atAi.
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Pomona College, put it: "Whiter but richer kids [come] in early; middle-
income kids and people of color apply later. It's a separate but maybe unequal
system.
' 6
The impact of early admission programs on access to higher education took
on yet greater importance in the wake of the Supreme Court's 2003 decisions in
Gratz v. Bollinger' and Grutter v. Bollinger.8 The cases brought to a close years of
litigation challenging the University of Michigan's undergraduate- and law-
school-admissions processes. In clear, cogent language, the Court announced
that educational diversity is a compelling interest that justifies the
consideration of race in higher education admissions practices. Dozens of
institutions of higher education filed or joined amicus briefs in support of the
University of Michigan, 9 arguing that a diverse student body is essential to
fulfill their educational missions.' ° Yet many of those same institutions
continue to employ early admission programs after Grutter and Gratz, even as
growing evidence suggests that the programs limit student-body diversity. One
of the questions this Note seeks to answer is why, if schools place such a high
premium on diversity, early admission programs have become so prevalent
over the past decade.
Early admission programs exploded in popularity during the 199os, and
the National Association of College Admissions Counseling (NACAC)
estimates that roughly one-third of the nation's 1400-plus four-year colleges
and universities now offer an early admission option.1 Between 199o and
1996, seventy colleges and universities started early decision programs. A study
by the NACAC found "significant evidence of a trickle down effect: the most
selective colleges had long used early admissions, while many of the less
6. Id. After expanding its early decision program, Pomona saw significantly fewer students
applying for financial aid. Id.
7- 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
8. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
9. For the complete list of amici in Grutter and Gratz, see Information on U-M Admissions
Lawsuits, http://www.umich.edu/~ureVadmissions/legal/amicus.html (last visited July 11,
2005).
lo. See, e.g., Brief of Amherst College et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 4,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. o2-241), Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003) (No. 02-516), reprinted in 319 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1210, 1219 (Gerhard Casper &
Kathleen M. Sullivan eds., 2004) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS].
ii. See Mary C. Bridgman, Early Admissions: Application Process Helps Some Get Leg up on Others,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Jan. 17, 2oo5, at C1.
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selective colleges ha[ve] implemented them since 199o. "'2 The programs are
heavily concentrated among the nation's elite schools,'3 but the programs have
moved to less selective schools over the last decade. Some schools now accept
half of their incoming classes through the programs. 
14
Early admission programs come in two basic forms -early decision (ED)
and early action (EA)- both of which allow high school seniors to apply to a
college or university in November. The schools then provide students with a
decision in early December, in advance of other colleges' regular-decision
application deadlines."5 Under ED, applicants promise that they will enroll if
admitted to the college or university. Under EA, students do not promise to
enroll if admitted, but still benefit from a school's early reply. Under both ED
and EA, a college can admit or reject an applicant, or defer consideration of the
application to its regular-decision admissions cycle.' 6 ED "predominates at the
most selective colleges," while EA is more common at less selective colleges. 17
This Note will focus on ED because, although ED and EA share certain
,8features, ED has greater inequitable effects on the college admissions process.
This Note argues that ED diminishes campus diversity. The Avery study
provides data analysis about early admission programs' wealth effects, but does
not thoroughly discuss its findings' implications for campus diversity.
Extrapolating from the study, it seems likely that, as colleges accept larger
percentages of their classes through ED, colleges' socioeconomic and racial
diversity are affected. A program that affects one may well impact the other;
while the Avery study notes this, it does not attempt a more detailed analysis of
the relation between race and ED. This Note moves beyond the Avery study to
further delineate ED's possible relation to a school's racial composition.
This Note is not only descriptive, but also prescriptive. It uses legal analysis
to shine light on possible solutions to these problems. There has been little
discussion of the legal implications of ED, and no other commentator has used
12. AVERY ET AL., supra note 1, at 36.
13. Id. at 1-2 (noting that nearly seventy percent of the private institutions on U.S. News &
World Report's lists of "Best National Universities" and "Best Liberal Arts Colleges" use an
early admission program).
14. See, e.g., Chanakya Sethi, Princeton Admits Half of Next Year's Class Early, DAILY
PRINCETONIAN, Jan. 8, 2004, LEXIS, News & Bus., Univ. Wire File.
15. Regular-decision application deadlines typically fall between December and early January.
Michelle Woo, Early Action Plans Help College-Bound Beat Stampede, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Jan. 23,
2005, at B3.
16. AVERY ET AL., supra note i, at 2.
17. Id. at 44-45.
18. See infra Part I.
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a legal framework, derived from either civil rights or antitrust law, to address
the ED debate. 9 The debate, until now, has centered on whether it is
appropriate for colleges and universities to employ ED programs in light of
their commitments to educational diversity and student well-being.2" The
discussions have largely focused on the institutions' preferences rather than
their legal obligations. Moving the debate away from educational choice and
toward the available legal frameworks emphasizes different facets of early
admission programs than the educational ethics debate does: It emphasizes
race and class impact in place of student well-being as a measure of the
programs' gains and losses. Legal analysis also provides a structure to the
debate that, through litigation, can mandate change. This may be especially
important because extralegal reform efforts, to date, have met with only limited
21
success.
This Note begins in Part I by briefly examining the rise of early decision. In
Part II, it then considers why, if schools are concerned about diversity, they
have done nothing about ED, when it has clear impacts on less privileged
students. Part III then analyzes the relevance of civil rights law. It demonstrates
how ED functions, and how schools might react to minority application
shortfalls resulting from ED. It argues that because of its disparate impact on
minority applicants, ED might violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.22
This Part of the Note focuses on civil rights analysis and separates out ED's
racial impact from more general discussions about ED's effects on student
well-being. It shows that ED programs, rather than raising diffuse, debatable
concerns, may in fact create specific legal harms that demand redress. A
significant practical problem exists, however, with civil rights analysis: There is
almost no readily available data about racial breakdowns for ED or regular-
decision applicants. This makes a civil rights violation harder to prove once
analysis moves outside the realm of theory. It is not an incurable problem,
however. As the Avery study shows, colleges and universities do have the
ig. The Avery study mentions legal issues in passing -often relegating them to footnotes - but
never provides any substantial legal analysis. For the one discussion in the report that briefly
discusses antitrust concerns about ED, see AVERY ET AL., supra note I, at 335 n.27.
20. See, e.g., Nancy Donehower, The Personal Touch Is Gone from College Admissions, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Jan. iO, 2003, at B16 (discussing the shift in admissions outlook as moving
from concern about students' well-being to focusing on "business" outcomes); Scott
Jaschik, Another Way in: Ex-Counselor Working Toward Less-Stressful College Admissions,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 30, 2005, at B9 (discussing Lloyd Thacker's Education Conservancy
and its work to re-humanize college admissions).
21. See infra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
22. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VI, 78 Stat. 241, 252-53 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. 5§ 20ood to 20ood-7 (2000)).
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information that would allow a robust civil rights analysis. Nevertheless, the
problem is a serious one, because they are extremely reluctant to release
the data.23
Part TV considers an alternate legal framework for evaluating ED: antitrust.
Moving to antitrust law shifts the focus from ED's racial impact to its
socioeconomic impact and cures the informational problems that would plague
any civil rights action. Given the practical limitations of civil rights analysis,
antitrust law offers an alternative legal ground on which litigants challenging
ED programs might prevail. While access to higher education has traditionally
been litigated under civil rights laws, antitrust precedent exists that could be
brought to bear in this context. Certain reciprocal actions by ED schools, used
to enforce students' promises to attend, might trigger an analysis similar to
that in United States v. Brown University. 4 And while introducing antitrust
law does move the debate from race to class, antitrust analysis, like civil rights
analysis, focuses the ED debate on a specific legal harm. Significantly, the
practical problems interfering with civil rights analysis do not exist in the
antitrust realm, permitting the application of a more robust legal critique to
ED programs.
While there has been some legislative gesturing toward ED reform, neither
the legal nor the educational community seems to have considered the
possibility that ED's fate lies not with the institutions that employ ED but with
the courts. Because both race and class have played such instrumental roles in
the diversity debates, this Note focuses its discussion of diversity on those
factors. For civil rights law, ED's racial effects come to the fore; in antitrust
analysis, ED's effects on different socioeconomic groups predominate. Both
civil rights law and antitrust law suggest that, beyond being unfair, ED
programs may actually be illegal. The Note then concludes by discussing
several options for reform. It argues that one option-a central first-choice
clearinghouse- better serves both students and colleges than does the current
model, while avoiding the more serious concerns raised by ED.
23. See infra Section IIIA.
24. 5 F.3d 658 (3 d Cir. 1993).
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I. THE RISE OF EARLY DECISION
Harvard, Yale, and Princeton first inaugurated ancestors of today's ED
programs in the mid-195os.2s For decades, the programs remained limited in
scope, 6 reserved only for top applicantsY.7 In the 198os, however, the market
for higher education shifted, as demand dropped off precipitously. Because
ED (but not EA) programs provide an almost one-to-one admit-to-enroll
ratio,28 many schools turned to ED programs, which "predictably fill[ed]
their classes."29
In 1983, schools were given a second reason to create ED programs to
control their enrollment figures: U.S. News & World Report had begun
publishing an annual guide, America's Best Colleges and Universities, which
parents, students, and high schools quickly began to rely on in assessing the
relative merits of universities and colleges.30 One recent study shows that
changes in U.S. News rank significantly affect a school's ability to attract
students.31 According to the study, a slip of five ranks requires a school to
increase the number of applicants admitted by two percent; when a school
dropped in rank, the average SAT scores of its incoming class dropped as well.
25. James Fallows, The Early-Decision Racket, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 20O1, at 37, 44. For a
more extended overview of the precursors to the present early admission system, see AVERY
ET AL., supra note i, at 25-30.
26. Amy Argetsinger, Where Early Decision Is Won and Lost, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2002, at Al.
27. AVERY ET AL., supra note 1, at 34; see also Fallows, supra note 25, at 44.
z8. AVERY ET AL., supra note i, at 174.
29. Justin Ewers, Decisions, Decisions, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 27, 2003, at 61
(confirming that ED programs help universities fill their classes). This continues to be the
case today. According to the Avery study:
(M]ost of the admissions offices that responded to our survey stated that Early
Decision helps them to manage enrollment figures for the entering class. A
common metaphor used in several surveys was that Early Decision helps to build
the base of the class. Locking in students through Early Decision acceptances also
shields a college from the consequence of some unexpected springtime disaster
that would discourage admitted candidates from attending the college.
AVERY ET AL., supra note 1, at 176 (internal quotation marks omitted).
3o. AVERY ET AL., supra note i, at 32.
31. The study analyzed the effect of the U.S. News & World Report rankings from 1987 to 1997
on both large universities and small liberal arts colleges. James Monks & Ronald G.
Ehrenberg, The Impact of U.S. News & World Report College Rankings on Admissions
Outcomes and Pricing Policies at Selective Private Institutions 6, 9-1o (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 7227, 1999), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7227;
see also Kate Zernike, Fortunes of Colleges Are Shown To Rise, Fall with Rankings, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 7, 2000, atAl.
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Schools that dropped in rank also had to offer admitted students more financial
aid to entice students to attend.32
In response, although schools publicly downplayed the rankings'
importance, a" they tried to influence the rankings by manipulating any factors
that they could control. 34 In one survey of241 colleges, more than half admitted
that they had instituted specific measures to improve their ranking.3" ED
programs were especially attractive because they allowed schools to control two
U.S. News factors: "selectivity" (the percentage of students a college accepts
from its applicant pool) and "yield" (the percentage of accepted students who
matriculate).36 By guaranteeing that an admitted student would enroll, ED
programs raised yield rates,37 and, in turn, reduced the number of applicants a
school needed to admit to fill its class-thus increasing the school's
selectivity. s As some schools added new ED programs, schools with existing
32. Monks & Ehrenberg, supra note 31, at 6.
33. Zernike, supra note 31.
34. See, e.g., Amy Argetsinger, Colleges Lobby To Move Up in the Polls: Schools Politicking Each
Other To Advance in Annual Rankings, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2002, at Ai; see also Zernicke,
supra note 31 (noting that Cornell, which used to count anyone who ever attended the school
as an alumnus, recently began excluding anyone who did not graduate because doing so
increased the percentage of alumni who donate to the school-one of the U.S. News &
World Report ranking factors).
35. Daniel J. Levin, Want a Better Guide to Colleges? So Do Colleges, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2002,
at B2.
36. Eliot Applestein, Applications, Admissions & College Rankings, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2000, at
C4.
37. The Avery study found that almost ninety-six percent of students admitted under ED
policies matriculate. AVERY ET AL., supra note I, at 174. The yield is not one hundred percent
because schools lose some students to whom they have offered insufficient financial aid, and
most colleges will release these students from their promises to attend. See infra notes 183-
184 and accompanying text.
38. Note Book, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 10, 1997, at A4 5 ("[A] counselor.., said colleges
were using early-decision programs to polish admissions statistics that are used by... U.S.
News & World Report .... 'There is no better way to shore up yield and drive down the
admit rate than through the use of early-decision programs."'). According to U.S. News &
World Report, "selectivity" and "yield" account for only about four percent of a school's
overall score. However, because most of the variables that make up a school's score are
difficult to change rapidly, Fallows, supra note 25, at 40, schools focus on admissions
statistics because those are the only numbers they can guarantee will change from year to
year. Number of Early-Decision Applicants Continues To Rise, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 9,
1998, at A55 (noting that Harvard may choose to admit a greater proportion of its class early
if the number of applicants continues to rise); see also Karen W. Arenson, Top Colleges Filling
More Slots with Students Who Apply Early, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 14, 1996, at Ai. Before dropping
"yield" as a statistic, U.S. News & World Report broke down the student selectivity score as
follows:
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
115: 88o 20o6
CIVIL RIGHTS, ANTITRUST, AND EARLY DECISION PROGRAMS
programs admitted higher percentages of their class early, in part to affect U.S.
News rankings. Schools recognized that the rankings affected "the number of
students who apply to a school, donations from alumni, pride and satisfaction
among students and faculty members, and even the terms on which colleges
can borrow money."39
During the early 199os, institutions found that ED had a third beneficial
effect: It limited financial aid expenditures. Traditionally, colleges had been
able to control their financial aid outlays only by limiting the amount of their
financial aid awards to admitted students. A case during the 199os, United
States v. Brown University,40 however, resulted in financial aid wars.4' The
decision forbids private schools from discussing financial aid awards with each
other, 4 leading many schools to lose even what little control they had over
their financial aid outlays. Private schools had to compete with one another,
43
and with public colleges and universities flush with budget surpluses because
of a booming economy in the mid- and late-199os. Because of the strong
economy, many states started merit-based scholarship programs to encourage
Student selectivity. A school's academic atmosphere is determined in part by the
abilities and ambitions of the student body. We therefore factor in test scores of
enrollees on the SAT or ACT tests (40 percent of this ranking factor); the
proportion of enrolled freshmen who graduated in the top io percent of their
high school classes for the national institutions and the top 25 percent for the
regional schools (35 percent of the score); the acceptance rate, or the ratio of
students admitted to applicants (15 percent); and the yield, or the ratio of
students who enroll to those admitted (io percent).
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, AMERICA'S BEST COLLEGES 30(2001).
39. Fallows, supra note 25, at 40. Fallows reports a story from Bruce Poch, Director of
Admissions at Pomona College in California:
These bond raters were obsessing about our yield! They were chastising me
because Pomona's yield was not as high as Williams's or Amherst's, because they
took more of their class early. We explained that our regular-decision yield was
quite high, and finally got a triple-A bond rating. Obviously, there were other
considerations, but this saved the college millions in interest.
Id. at 42.
4o. 805 F. Supp. 288,296 (E.D. Pa. 1992), rev'd 5 F. 3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
41. Stephen Burd, Private Colleges Seek To Extend Antitrust Exemption for Aid Talks, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 16, 2001, at A25; Ben Gose, Changes at Elite Colleges Fuel Intense
Competition in Student Aid, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 5, 1999, at A42 (discussing the
Department of Justice investigation that spawned the suit).
42. United States v. Brown Univ. (Brown Univ. I/), 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
43. Gose, supra note 41. Most elite private schools had to compete against each other through
financial aid awards for the first time in the wake of the Justice Department's disbanding of
the Overlap Group. See infra Part IV.
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their top high school students to attend college in-state." Some students were
able to pit public or private institutions against one another and raise their
financial aid offers by several thousand dollars. 41 Most private colleges did not
have unlimited financial aid budgets, and these new developments strained
their limited resources. 46
Then, during the late 199os, public colleges and universities began
experiencing financial strains. A slowing economy led to widespread state
budget cuts for higher education. By the late 199os, therefore, both public and
private institutions were looking for ways to make up the funding shortfall
without tuition increases that would draw the ire of students, parents, and
state and federal lawmakers.47
Schools turned to ED programs because such programs allowed them to
limit, to a certain extent, financial aid outlays. ED permitted schools to
minimize financial aid expenditures 4' because ED applicants were generally
wealthier and less likely to apply for financial aid than members of the general
applicant pool. If colleges did accept needy ED applicants, the students were
bound to the school and did not have the option of comparing financial aid
packages or negotiating a better award.49
44. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Farrell, Public-College Tuition Rise Is Largest in Three Decades, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 31, 2003, at A33 ("In an effort to elevate their academic prestige, many
state universities have devoted more financial resources to providing merit-based aid in the
form of scholarship programs for students with high standardized-test scores and top
grades."); Patrick Healy, More State Legislatures Consider Merit Scholarships for College
Students, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 15, 1998, at A42; Peter Schmidt, As Economy Chugs
Along, States Pour Money into Higher Education, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 17, 1999, at
A28.
45. Jenna Kussell, Top Applicants Bargaining for More Aid from Colleges, BOSTON GLOBE, June 12,
2002, at Ai.
46. Gose, supra note 41.
47. Farrell, supra note 44 (discussing a College Board study showing a connection between state
budget cuts and increases in tuition); see also Michael Arnone, State Budget Writers Are Urged
To Protect College Access and Affordability, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 21, 2004,
http://chronicle.com/daily/2oo4/ol/200 4 o121oan.htm (discussing a report by the National
Center for Public Policy in Higher Education urging "governors and state lawmakers [to]
enact 'emergency measures' to" maintain higher education affordability).
48. AVERY ETAL., supra note 1, at 176-79.
49. Ben Gose, A Competitive Edge: Students Hope Early Decision Applications Will Help Them Get
into Good Colleges, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 15, 1996, at A39 ("A disproportionate
number of [wealthy] students apply early.... Students who need financial aid traditionally
have applied to several colleges and waited to see which gave them the best offer. That...
precludes them from applying early.").
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Thus, by the late 199os, schools had discovered three distinct institutional
benefits of early admission programs-particularly ED programs. The
programs stabilized enrollment, protected U.S. News and World Report
rankings, and limited financial aid outlays. Colleges and universities also
argued that the programs benefited those students who had a strong preference
for one institution and were willing to commit to a single school early in the
admissions process. Those students could clearly communicate their desire to
attend to their top school choice, and would, hopefully, be finished with the
stress of the admissions process before Christmas of their senior year.
The release of the Avery study and the Supreme Court's opinion in Grutter
upset this delicate balance. The Avery study-the most thorough analysis
available of the effects of early admission programs on the admissions
process° -presented a competing set of concerns about early admission
programs. It found that, for both EA and ED programs, early applicants
received a significant boost to their admissions chances, equivalent to a one-
hundred-point jump in their SAT I score."1 The study also showed that the
lion's share of the ED benefit went to wealthy students with sophisticated
knowledge of the college admissions process, who applied earlier at higher
rates than their less privileged peers."2
Early admission programs work to the benefit of the wealthy partly because
the wealthy, to a greater extent than the poor, have access to information about
the benefits of applying early. Indeed, public information on early admission
programs varies in accuracy and clarity, while the well-connected have access to
more accurate information from friends, family, and college counselors. 3 The
information gap exists equally for both EA and ED programs.
Moreover, even if they knew about it, poor students could not take
advantage of ED because these students must first be certain that they wish to
attend a particular college. Attaining that level of certainty generally requires
funds for at least one trip, if not several, to various campuses. Further, when
students apply ED, they "forfeit the option of negotiating financial aid. This
barrier often leads financial aid candidates to apply .. . regular decision,
5o. The Avery study analyzed five years of admissions data from fourteen highly selective
colleges and universities. AVERY ET AL., supra note i, at 9.
51. Id. at 137. In other words, if all other academic factors were held constant, a student's odds
of being admitted under ED were the same as if he had been a regular-decision applicant
with an SAT score loo points higher than the student's actual score. Thus an ED applicant
with a 1200 SAT score was as likely to be admitted as a regular-decision applicant who, with
otherwise identical credentials, had achieved a 1300 SAT score.
52. Id. at 13.
53. Id. at 85-88.
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putting them at a disadvantage relative to wealthier students who may gain a
boost in admission chances by applying early." 4
II. DIVERSITY AS A COMPELLING INTEREST IN HIGHER EDUCATION
While ED programs were growing rapidly, institutions of higher education
fought a fierce battle to diversify their student bodies. It would seem illogical
for colleges to maintain an unnecessary barrier to improving diversity. Changes
both inside and outside of individual institutions, however, have pushed
schools into precisely that scenario.
Diversity, as a topic in educational thought, dates back more than 150
years.5 Educators originally deemed interaction among "dissimilar individuals"
to be "essential to learning.", 6 The concept of diversity expanded over time to
encompass not just differences in students' ideas, but also differences of
"geography, religion, nation of birth, upbringing, wealth, gender, and race. '
In the last thirty years, the pursuit of diversity in higher education has
migrated into Supreme Court doctrine as a compelling justification for state
action. This Part discusses, in brief, how diversity became such an important
focus for both the legal and higher education communities. It then attempts to
explain why, if schools are so committed to diversity, they have not reformed
their early admission programs.
A. Diversity: Educational Benefit, Societal Imperative
i. Bakke: Diversity as Educational Benefit
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, ss the Supreme Court
struck down the quota-based admissions system at the medical school of the
University of California. Justice Powell's controlling opinion held that, while
the school's racial quota system was unconstitutional, the medical school did
have a legitimate interest in the consideration of race, namely, "obtaining the
educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student body." 9
s4. Id. at 13.
5s. WiLLiAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER 218 (1998).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 218-19.
58. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
59. Id. at 306.
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Justice Powell located the right to select a diverse student body in the
educational institution's right to academic freedom under the First
Amendment, concluding that "It]he freedom of a university to make its own
judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body. , 6o
Powell argued that a diverse student population altered the very nature of
the education students at the institution received:
Physicians serve a heterogeneous population. An otherwise qualified
medical student with a particular background -whether it be ethnic,
geographic, culturally advantaged or disadvantaged- may bring to a
professional school of medicine experiences, outlooks, and ideas that
enrich the training of its student body and better equip its graduates to
render with understanding their vital service to humanity.61
Powell concluded that students from different backgrounds created a richer
learning environment for their peers by providing information and viewpoints
beyond those offered by any single professor, or even any homogenous group.
Beyond the realm of medicine, Powell believed that the "nation's future
depend[ed] upon leaders trained through wide exposure to the ideas and
mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples. ", 6, In training
future leaders, the university had a vested interest in selecting a student body
that "contribute[d]" to a "robust exchange of ideas. ''6, Powell maintained that
"[t]he atmosphere of speculation, experiment and creation-so essential to the
quality of higher education-is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse
student body."6, In keeping with his interest in many kinds of diversity, Justice
Powell emphasized that race could only be considered along with other factors,
like socioeconomic disadvantage, in creating a diverse student body.6 s
6o. Id. at 312.
61. Id. at 314.
62. Id. at 313 (internal quotation marks omitted).
63. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. Id. at 312 (internal quotation marks omitted).
65. Id. at 315 ("It is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity [that justifies the use of race] ....
The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of
qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though
important element.").
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2. Grutter and Gratz: Diversity as Societal Imperative
Twenty-five years later, the Supreme Court again took up the issue of
diversity and affirmative action in higher education. A developed body of
affirmative action law framed the debate in the University of Michigan cases.
In the years after Bakke, the Court had limited the number of acceptable
affirmative action rationales and program types under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Against this backdrop, affirmative
action in higher education appeared at risk.66
In Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, however, the Court reaffirmed
its commitment to diversity in higher education. Justice O'Connor, writing for
the Grutter majority, affirmed that diversity is a compelling state interest 67 and
rejected the notion that the post-Bakke decisions foreclosed the diversity
rationale.68 The Court deferred to the law school's educational judgment that
diversity was essential to its educational mission, reflecting universities'
"special niche in our constitutional tradition."6,
The Court also emphasized the educational benefits that flow from a
diverse student body, stating that colleges and universities could select
students who would "contribute the most to the 'robust exchange of ideas."'7
This reasoning closely followed that of Justice Powell in Bakke. The Grutter
opinion also emphasized the importance of having a diverse national
leadership. The Court recognized that only if members of all racial and ethnic
groups could access higher education would they be able to participate fully in
the nation's civic life.71 For the Grutter Court, the societal need for a diverse
leadership provided a second compelling reason to allow colleges and
66. In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 274-76 (1986), the Supreme Court
rejected the need for role models as a compelling government interest for the purposes of
strict scrutiny analysis. The Court struck down a program in which minority teachers were
hired first and fired last in order to ensure that there were role models for minority students.
In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), the Court, again applying strict
scrutiny, struck down a race-based set-aside for minority contractors that was designed to
address broad societal discrimination. The Court ruled that because the city failed to show
specific racial discrimination in the Richmond construction industry, the city could not use
race-based affirmative action. Finally, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995), the Court held that strict scrutiny applied equally to federal and state affirmative
action programs and to both beneficial and burdensome racial classifications.
67. 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003).
68. Id. at 328.
69. Id. at 329.
70. Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313).
71. Id. at 332.
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universities to consider race in admissions.7' Grutter underscored the value of
diversity in higher education, and Michigan and its amici embraced that view.
73
B. Studies Relevant to the Diversity Debate
Different empirical and sociological studies - including several proffered by
the University of Michigan-have borne out the Supreme Court's concern for
diversity in higher education. 74 Michigan's central study, conducted by Patricia
Gurin, found that students who experienced classrooms and social settings
with the greatest racial and ethnic diversity "showed the greatest engagement
in active thinking processes, growth in intellectual engagement and
motivation, and growth in intellectual and academic skills." s7 Another study,
this one of the black-white composition of small groups of students on three
campuses, found that groups with racial- and opinion-minority members, or
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Brief of Amherst College et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note
lo, at 5 ("The point is so basic, and the agreement of educators is so broad, that amici need
not argue it at length. Diversity in all its aspects is one of the factors that make American
colleges and universities unique, educationally superior, and the envy of the world."
(citation omitted)).
74. Michigan has made the complete set of studies, as well as responses to critiques of the
studies, available on its lawsuit-related website. Information on U-M Admissions Lawsuits,
http://www.umich.edu/~ureVadmissions/research/index.htm (last visited July 11, 2005).
7S. Expert Report of Patricia Gurin, Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000)
(No. 97-CV- 75321), Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (No. 97-CV-
75928), reprinted in Reports Submitted on Behalf of the University of Michigan: The Compelling
Need for Diversity in Higher Education, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 363, 365 (1999). Gurin studied
multi-institutional national data, the results of an extensive survey of students at the
University of Michigan, and data drawn from a specific classroom program at the University
of Michigan. See Information on U-M Admissions Lawsuits: Gurin-The Studies: Methods
and Measures, http://www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/research/expert/studies.html (last
visited Nov. 16, 2005); see also Patricia Gurin et a., Diversity and Higher Education: Theory
and Impact on Educational Outcomes, 72 HARv. EDUC. REv. 330 (2002). But see Brief for
National Association of Scholars as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. o2-241), Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No.
02-516), reprinted in 321 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note io, at 402 (critiquing the Gurin
study's findings). For a response to this critique, see Patricia Gurin, Response to the
Critique by the National Association of Scholars of the Expert Witness Report of Patricia
Gurin in Gratz, et al. v. Bollinger, et al. and Grutter v. Bollinger, et al., http://www.umich.edu
/-urel/admissions/research/gurin.html (last visited June 25, 2005).
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those who reported having racially diverse friends and classmates, experienced
increased discursive complexity.
76
Similarly, Derek Bok and William Bowen's iconic study, The Shape of the
River, provides solid evidence that affirmative action meets the societal needs
described by Justice O'Connor.77 Bok and Bowen found that having a diverse
community during college affected the post-college attitudes and actions of
matriculants -both black and white. Matriculants reported extremely high
levels of interracial interaction at the selective institutions.78 The more selective
the schools, the higher the level of black-white interactions.79 Bok and Bowen
found that white students who interacted extensively with black students in
college continued to have extensive interracial interactions after college." °
C. Race and Class in the Avery Study
Given the widespread recognition that diversity is an important educational
good, one might think that if so many schools have chosen ED, it must foster-
76. Anthony Lising Antonio et al., The Effects of Racial Diversity on Complex Thinking in College
Students, 15 PSYCHOL. SC. 507 (2004).
77. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 55.
78. Id. at 231.
79. Id. at 237.
80. Id. at 238-39. In the years since The Shape of the River's release several studies have reached
starkly different conclusions. See, e.g., Stanley Rothman et al., Does Enrollment Diversity
Improve University Education?, 15 INT'L J. FOR PuB. OPINION RES. 8 (2003) (finding that when
students', faculties', and administrators' evaluations of the educational and racial
atmosphere were correlated with the percentage of minority students enrolled at a college or
university, the predicted positive associations of educational benefits and interracial
understanding failed to appear). Justice Thomas noted two studies in his Grutter dissent
that found that black cognitive development and academic achievement were higher at
historically black colleges. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 364 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (citing W.R. Allen, The Color of Success: Afiican-American College Student
Outcomes at Predominantly White and Historically Black Public Colleges and Universities, 62
HARV. EDUC. REV. 26, 35 (1992); Lamont Flowers & Ernest T. Pascarella, Cognitive Effects of
College Racial Composition on African American Students After 3 Years of College, 40 J.C.
STUDENT DEv. 669, 674 (1999)). Justice Thomas also noted another study that found that
racially diverse student bodies that were created through affirmative action actually
undermined students' perception of academic quality. Stanley Rothman et al., Racial
Diversity Reconsidered, 151 PUB. INT. 25 (2003). Justice Thomas explained that the study
found "that the racial mix of a student body produced by racial discrimination of the type
practiced by the Law School in fact hinders students' perception of academic quality."
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 364 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thus, though there is strong evidence in
support of the Court's interest in racial diversity in higher education, the position is not
without its critics.
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or at least not reduce- diversity. Yet, as discussed above, the Avery study
shows that students who apply ED "are disproportionately non minorities
from advantaged backgrounds." 8' Further, at ED schools "African Americans
and Hispanics applied early at lower rates than the overall early application
rate. Across the schools, African Americans applied early about half as often as
others; Hispanics about two-thirds as often as others .... Similarly, financial
aid applicants were less likely than others to apply early.',8
Among the study's interviewees, over eighty percent of the students from
prominent private high schools applied early, as did more than three-quarters
of the students for whom "financial aid was not a concern."8 ' Students from
less competitive public high schools applied early at just half the rate of their
private school classmates, and less than half of those students who considered
financial aid important in their college choice applied early."s
The study explains that the results were driven in part by the challenge
involved in finding the right school.15 "Students who expect[ed] to rely on
financial aid faced an especially difficult decision about whether to apply" ED,
in part due to ED's increased odds of admission. 6 On the one hand, if a
student applied ED and was admitted, he might receive a smaller financial aid
package than he would have had he been admitted as a regular applicant and
been able to "compare and negotiate financial aid packages.",8  On the other
hand, if he did not apply ED, his chances of being rejected altogether increased
significantly."8 The Avery study finds that nearly half of the students who
81. AvERY ET AL., supra note 1, at 59.
82. Id. (stating that "3.6 percent of African Americans and 4.8 percent of Hispanics applied early
at ED schools, while 7.4 percent of all applicants to those schools applied early").
83. Id.; see also Mark Helm, Finding Financial Aid for College Can Be Confusing and Frustrating,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRm., Feb. 2, 2003, at H5 (citing Harris Poll results finding that "two-
thirds of African-American and Hispanic parents said that they don't have enough
information about how to pay for college"); Kari Neering, College Aid Hunt Daunting for
Some, J. NEws (Westchester County, N.Y.), Jan. 27, 2003, at 1A.
84. AERY ET AL., supra note 1, at 59 ("Among those who went to a prominent private high
school, 83.5 percent applied early; among those students for whom financial aid was not a
concern, 78.0 percent applied early to some college. In contrast, of the students who went to
less competitive public high schools (where it is common for graduates not to go on to
college), only 42.6 percent applied early. Similarly, among the colleges students who
reported that financial aid was important to their choice of college, only 48.0 percent applied
early to some college.").
85. Id. at 59-6o.
86. Id. at 116.
87. Id. at 116; see also infra notes 18o-182.
88. AERYETAL., supra note 1, at 116.
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applied ED did so for strategic reasons- regardless of whether they actually
had a first-choice college or not-and students who did not need financial aid
made the decision to apply ED more easily than those who did. 9
The study also shows that students' degree of access to information about
the benefits of applying early varies widely.9° The study considers all of the
resources that high school students use to gather college information-
guidance counselors, college websites, family and friends, admissions officers,
and commercial guidebooks -and finds the generally available sources rife
with misleading and contradictory information. For example, while the Avery
study shows that all students benefit from applying ED wherever possible,
between 1997 and 2002 the guides gave students varying information, some of
which directly contradicted the Study's findings. One guide said students
benefit from applying ED at all schools, while another stated that students
benefit from applying ED only to lower-ranked schools. One guide announced
that an advantage exists for applying ED; another said that it does not. One
guide said that students should apply strategically to gain the benefit of ED;
another said that they should only apply ED if the school was their first
choice.91
In contrast to generally available information sources, those that vary in
relation to an applicant's social background-guidance counselors, family, and
friends -provide information that increases in accuracy as student privilege
increases. 92 Guidance counselors offer one clear example: All of the guidance
counselors interviewed at nationally prominent high schools knew that
applying ED would increase a student's chances of being admitted. 93 In
interviews with college students, however, it became clear that only about one-
third of guidance counselors overall "indicated that applying early would help
[students'] chances of admission" or generally encouraged students to apply
early- as opposed to one hundred percent of the elite counselors. Indeed, more
than sixteen percent of students believed that their counselor "hindered" their
application process.9 4
89. Id. at 206-07; see also Claire Luna, Latino Parents Often Lack College-Entry Savvy, L.A. TiMEs,
July 12, 2002, at B4 (recounting the results of a study of more than one thousand Latino
parents showing little or no knowledge of college preparation).
90. AVERYETAL., supra note i, at lo.
91. Id. at 74-78.
92. See, e.g., id. at 12-13, 87.
93. Id. at 85.
94- Id. at 86.
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The differing quality of advice translates into real differences in students'
understanding of early admission. Interviews with 350 students from Harvard,
Yale, MIT, and Princeton revealed that students' levels of understanding varied
widely.9 To determine whether "students from more prominent high schools
were better informed [about early admission programs] than those from less
competitive schools," the study divides the students' high schools into five
categories, and finds that students' levels of understanding rose or fell with
high school status, dropping as students moved from more elite to less elite
high schools. Ninety percent of the students from the most prominent private
high schools, and eighty-four percent from the best public high schools, "had a
full understanding of early applications when they applied to college." 96 At the
other end of the spectrum, among Harvard, Princeton, MIT, and Yale students
who attended high schools in the lowest category, almost half did not fully
understand the early application process when they applied to college.17 In
sum, the Avery study reveals not only the advantages reaped by ED applicants,
but also that socioeconomically privileged students were most likely to
participate in the programs, both because they could afford to forgo comparing
financial aid packages from different colleges, and because they better
understood the benefits of applying through ED.
D. Barriers to Reform
Concerns about ED's effects on student-body diversity have drawn
attention from major university leaders, including Yale's President, Richard
Levin,98 and even the United States Senate. 99 U.S. News & World Report
95. Id. at 72-74.
96. Id. at 73.
97. Id.
98. See Karen W. Arenson, Yale Changes Its Approach to Admissions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2002, at
A27 (quoting President Levin of Yale as saying "[t]he only people served by early decision is
the colleges"); Patrick Healy, Stanford Joins Yale in Dropping Early Admissions Policy, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 7, 2002, at A2o.
99. Senator Edward Kennedy, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Health, Education, Labor,
and Pensions Committee, proposed reforming ED as part of the reauthorization of the
Higher Education Act. See S. 1793, io8th Cong. §§ 3(2)(1), 302(a), 302(b)(2) (2003). The
proposal would have required colleges with ED programs to inform the federal government
of the percentage of each enrolled class admitted under ED, broken down by race and Pell
Grant status. Schools that did not comply could have lost eligibility for federal financial aid.
The proposal also responded to concerns that schools had expressed that any collective ED
reform effort would be an antitrust violation; the bill would have waived federal antitrust
regulations and allowed college representatives to develop common guidelines to end
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changed its rankings formula, dropping the yield category, in an effort to
decrease schools' incentives to employ ED to manipulate their rankings."' The
push toward reform, however, has had a limited impact. Although Stanford
and Yale have dropped their ED programs in favor of an EA program known as
Single Choice Early Action (SCEA),10 few major schools have followed their
lead." 2 In fact, some top schools have continued to actively defend their ED
programs as beneficial not just for the schools, but for students as well." 3
If schools know that ED reduces diversity, and those same schools desire
diversity, why has there not been significant change in the use of the
programs? Commentators have suggested that it is no coincidence that the
three schools that have taken a strong position on early admission programs -
Harvard, Stanford, and Yale-have phenomenally high yields. 1 4 The schools
were able to adopt EA because its nonbinding nature was unlikely to affect
their yield: Most accepted students would attend, whether they were required
to or not.0 5 Colleges with less appeal-the majority of schools with ED plans-
have more to lose by adopting EA and will be more likely to retain ED. These
binding ED admissions policies. See Stephen Burd, Key Issues Before Congress, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 30, 2004, at B21; Tiffany Hoffman, Bill May Alter Admission Policies,
COLLEGIATE TIMEs, Nov. 7, 2003, at 1; Kat Schmidt, Bill Threatens Early Decision, TUFTS
DAILY, Nov. 7, 2003, LEXIS, News & Bus., Univ. Wire File.
loo. Jacques Steinberg, College Rating by U.S. News Drops Factor in Admissions, N.Y. TIMEs, July
10, 2003, at A14; Jeffrey R. Young, 'U.S. News' Drops a Controversial Part of Its Formula for
Ranking Colleges, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 11, 2003, http://chronicle.com/daily/
2003/o7/2003o711o3n.htm. Dropping the "yield" statistic will not completely remove
schools' incentives to employ ED. ED's one-to-one yield also affects a school's selectivity,
because schools that adopt ED do not need to accept as many students as those schools that
do not. Unless U.S. News & World Report also drops the selectivity statistic, which seems
unlikely, schools can still manipulate the rankings.
1o. Jeffrey R. Young, Yale and Stanford End Early-Decision Options and Defy National Group,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 22, 2002, at A58. SCEA requires that the student apply only to
one school early, but it still allows the student to apply to as many schools at the regular
application deadlines as he chooses.
102. Yassmin Sadeghi, Early Admissions Still Ignite Debate, YALE DAiLY NEwS, Feb. 18, 2005, at 1
(noting that only "Harvard, Stanford and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology have
switched to single-choice early action"). Harvard has consistently maintained EA, refusing
to switch to ED even as its competitors did so.
103. See, e.g., Mary Haile, Early Decision Numbers Plunge at Dartmouth, DARTMOUTH, Jan. 6,
2005, LEXIS, News & Bus., Univ. Wire File (reporting comments from Dartmouth Dean of
Admissions, Karl Furstenberg, supporting ED); see also AVERY ET AL., supra note i, at 17
("[Other prominent institutions such as Columbia and Penn have made it quite clear that
they like Early Decision.").
104. See, e.g., AVERY ET AL., supra note i, at 273; Ewers, supra note 29, at 61.
1o5. AVERY ET AL., supra note i, at 272-73.
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schools, once they and their competitors adopt ED, cannot afford to back
down.
As in a classic prisoner's dilemma,1°6 if all of the schools that adopted ED
for competitive reasons could be convinced to drop ED, all of the schools
would be better off. However, schools that adopted ED for competitive reasons
would hesitate to drop the program unilaterally; if they did so, their U.S. News
& World Report rankings would change accordingly. 107 As a result, even though
many college administrators would welcome reform,"°8 they will only change
their practices if "all colleges, or at least . . . all with whom they regularly
compete" do so simultaneously. 0 9 If the change is not simultaneous and
universal, it will not succeed.
Schools have created a situation for themselves "in which any single
institution or small group of institutions may think that to give up [ED] would
be tantamount to unilateral disarmament in the admissions wars."' 0 Reform
must be coordinated. The schools, however, cannot bring about change
because antitrust concerns prevent concerted action by any group of schools."'
Yet schools also remain unwilling to accept outside intervention: Proposed
legislation that would allow ED reform encountered vehement opposition from
both the NACAC"2 and individual institutions. "3 Many schools, even if they
disliked ED, felt that it was inappropriate for the federal government to
intervene in institutional decisions.
106. Id. at 261-63 (noting that the ED reform process can be understood as a prisoner's
dilemma).
107. The Avery study quotes Harvard's William Fitzsimmons's succinct description of the key
difficulty of abandoning early admissions: "'If we gave it up, other institutions inside and
outside the Ivy League would carve up our class and our faculty would carve us up.'" Id. at
272. The same holds true for abandoning ED in favor of EA, if competitor schools still
offered ED.
1o8. Karen W. Arenson, Change on Early Admission Produces Application Shifts, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov.
13, 2003, at A27.
iog. AVERY ETAL., supra note i, at 259.
11o. Richard W. Lyman, Who Should Reform Early-Decision Programs?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Nov. 21, 2003, at B5.
mii. Yale's President, Richard Levin, sought an antitrust exemption from the Department of
Justice that would have allowed the Ivy League presidents to meet and discuss a collective
change. Ultimately, "the Justice Department signaled that it might view [the meeting] as
anti-competitive," but that a formal review of the issue would probably take months.
Arenson, supra note 98; Healy, supra note 98.
112. Jeffrey R. Young, Counselors Group Fears Congress Will Limit Early-Decision Admissions
Programs, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 17, 2003, at A42.
113. Schmidt, supra note 99.
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III. EARLY DECISION AND CIVIL RIGHTS
Courts have a long history of remedying civil rights inequities in
education.11 4 Information about ED's impact on students of different races is
limited, but based on the information available, this Part explains why ED
programs might violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
A. Early Decision's Impact on Minority Enrollment
Sources discussing ED's implications for racial minorities are rare. Colleges
and universities fiercely guard their admissions data,' with the result that little
is reported about how ED and race interact. The Avery study, the major work
on ED, assumes that racial minorities are unaffected by ED. In contrast, the
Bok and Bowen study on affirmative action assumes that, unless institutions
correct for ED's racial effects, ED reduces the number of minority students at
an institution. The two positions are not mutually exclusive and help
illuminate the problems driving the civil rights analysis of ED. The all-things-
being-equal presupposition of the Avery study becomes the root of the ED civil
rights problem.
Although the Avery study is exhaustive in many respects, it provides only
limited information about race. The study's authors felt that institutional
priorities gave three groups-athletic recruits, alumni children, and
underrepresented minorities-a substantial edge in the admissions process,
regardless of when those students applied. The study made the assumption
that applicants from those groups neither gained nor lost from early admission
programs, and thus omitted the groups from much of its analysis.
The study does, however, break down racial group trends in the early and
regular admissions stages. The study finds that EA and ED applicants are
disproportionately white and Asian students from advantaged backgrounds. At
each of the fourteen colleges in the study, African-Americans and Hispanics
applied early at lower rates than other applicants. Across the schools using ED
programs, African-Americans applied early about half as often as others;
Hispanics about two-thirds as often as others." 6
In contrast, The Shape of the River posits that the low number of minority
applicants under early admission programs would, all other things being equal,
114. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
115. AVERY ETAL., supra note 1, at 306.
116. See supra note 82.
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ultimately lower the number of minority students at a college or university.117
The difference between the two positions comes from the assumption about
"all other things being equal." The Avery study assumes that schools will
intervene, through affirmative action, to prevent the low number of minority
ED applicants from affecting the number of underrepresented minorities on
campus. However, that assumption is legally problematic in the wake of
Grutter and Gratz: If schools adjust for losses from ED, they risk running afoul
of the Supreme Court's Equal Protection jurisprudence; if the schools do not
adjust, they may violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The positions taken by the Avery and Bok-Bowen studies suggest that if a
school accepts a relatively low number of underrepresented minorities through
its ED program, it can respond in two possible ways during its regular-
admissions process. First, the school can make up for any shortfall in minority
ED applicants during its regular decision period. In order to do so, it would
likely have to apply heightened affirmative action at this point. Second, the
school can choose not to respond at all, regardless of the shortfall in minority
applications during the ED cycle. This would result in an overall class with
lower minority enrollment. Thus, if a school implements an ED program (as
many did during the 199os), yet otherwise remains constant in its admissions
process, it will likely reduce the number of minority students in its incoming
classes."'
B. Title VI and Fourteenth Amendment Analysis
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applies to both public and private
institutions that receive federal funds." 9 Section 6ol provides that no person
shall, "on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity" covered by Title VI. 2 ° Section 602 authorizes
federal agencies to implement the provisions of section 6oi "by issuing rules,
regulations, or orders of general applicability.' 21 Exercising this authority, the
117. BOWEN &BoK, supra note 5S, at 38 n.24.
118. The more selective the college, the more likely it is (with the exception of Stanford, Yale,
and Harvard) to have an ED program. So if schools are not compensating for their ED
programs, minority students are not only losing ground-they are losing it at the most
selective and prestigious schools.
119. 42 U.S.C. §§ 200od to 20ood-7 (2000).
12o. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 6ol, 78 Star. 241, 252 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 2oood (2000)).
121. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 6o2 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 20ood-1 (2000)).
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Department of Education promulgated a regulation to create a right of action
against institutions that sponsor programs that have a disparate impact on
underrepresented minorities. 122 As the discussion above demonstrates, the
disparate impact from ED could trigger this Title VI protection.
To defend their ED programs against a Title VI challenge, schools might
point out that the analysis above is inaccurate. Rather than letting the minority
population drop after the adoption of ED, schools could simply adjust for the
ED shortfall by accepting more minority students at the regular-decision stage.
That argument, however, faces a legal challenge from Supreme Court
precedent in Connecticut v. Teal.
123
The Teal plaintiffs filed suit to protest a written examination that
Connecticut required from employees who applied to be promoted to positions
as Welfare Eligibility Supervisors. The plaintiffs argued that this screening test
had a disparate impact on black applicants, who passed the test at only sixty-
eight percent of the rate of their white competition. In response to the suit,
Connecticut raised a "bottom line" defense. The state showed that, under its
affirmative action program, the state hired a higher percentage of blacks who
passed the test than whites who passed. The result, the state claimed, washed
out any disparate impact initially caused by the test, because the bottom line
was that the same number of blacks were hired with or without the test. The
Supreme Court rejected Connecticut's argument by focusing on the individual
employee, rather than on the minority group as whole" : The fact that the
122. 34 C.F.R. § 1oo.3 (2004). Recent cases from the Supreme Court, however, indicate that it
may be difficult to find a plaintiff to bring suit. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001),
denies a private right of action under Title VI. If any party has the ability to enforce the
disparate impact regulations under Tide VI, it may be the Office of Civil Rights at the
Department of Education. The Office of Civil Rights has the right to promulgate and
enforce regulations for Title VI. 42 U.S.C. §§ 20ood-1, 20ood- 5 (2000); 34 C.F.R. § loo.8
(2004). However, given the Office's current tenor and its focus on opening up programs
that are explicitly limited to minority students, the Office is unlikely to pursue a case against
schools with early admission policies that may have a disparate impact on the basis of race.
See, e.g., Peter Schmidt, Iowa State Changes Minority Program, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar.
28, 2003, at A24 (reporting that Iowa State University has agreed to open a previously race-
exclusive summer program to nonminority applicants after receiving letters from the Center
for Equal Opportunity and the American Civil Rights Institute warning that they would file
a complaint with the Office for Civil Rights unless the college changed the criteria for
program participation); Peter Schmidt & Jeffrey R. Young, MIT and Princeton Open 2
Summer Programs to Students of All Races, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 21, 2003, at A31. In
his dissent in Sandoval, Justice Stevens suggested that private plaintiffs might still be able to
pursue a Title VI disparate impact claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 299-
300 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
124. Id. at 453-54, 455-56.
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state had acted in the minority group's interest by enacting an affirmative
action program did not repair the harm done to the individual employee who,
because of the discriminatory screening process, did not make it to the second
step of the hiring process. The Court allowed that a bottom line defense might
eliminate the possibility of a discriminatory intent, but pointed out that courts
do not consider intent in disparate impact cases.12
The Teal precedent may or may not apply to ED. While courts have often
applied standards from Title VII in the Title VI context,126 there does not
appear to be Title VI case law applying Teal's "bottom line" analysis in the
college admissions context. However, courts have applied Teal in other Title VI
contexts.12 7 There may be a significant distinction between a test that
disadvantages minority job applicants and a program that prevents more
minorities from even applying. If a court did adopt Teal, a college's affirmative
action regular-decision correction for the minority drop-off caused by ED
would not provide a defense to an ED disparate impact claim. Like the
applicant test in Teal, ED is an identifiable, discrete part of the admissions
process that can be distinguished from the admissions process as a whole. The
court could thus separate ED for the purposes of disparate impact analysis. If a
court were to isolate the ED program, it would not matter whether a school
admitted the same final number of minority students with or without an ED
program because individual students would still be harmed when the school
decided to institute ED. They would be the students, analogous to the harmed
125. Id. at 454-55.
126. See, e.g., N.Y. Urban League, Inc. v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting
that courts in Title VI disparate impact cases have looked to Title VII cases for guidance);
Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330, 1336 ( 9 th Cir. 199o) (noting that courts frequently look to
Title VII to determine rights and procedures available under Title VI); Ga. State Conference
of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (ith Cir. 1985) (applying the test
from Title VII to a disparate impact claim under Title VI); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969,
982 n.9 ( 9 th Cir. 1984) (noting that Title VII's "manifest relation" standard applies to
disparate impact cases brought under Title VI); NAACP v. Med. Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322,
1331 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc) (noting that Title VII standards are instructive in a Title VI
case).
127. See, e.g., Chicago v. Lindley, 66 F.3d 819, 829 (7th Cir. 1995) (assuming that although Teal
is a Title VII case, "the principle for which it stands is applicable in a Title VI case as well");
Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1420 (1ith Cir. 1993) (citing Teal's
disparate impact analysis in a Title VI case); Riles, 793 F.2d 969 (holding that 1Oplacement
tests for special education classes created an unacceptable disparate impact on African-
American children and were not required by educational necessity); Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F.
Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (holding that NCAA freshman-year-eligibility rules had an
unjustified disparate impact on African-American students), rev'd on other grounds, 198 F.3d
107 (3d Cir. 1999).
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job applicants in Teal, who were able neither to apply under ED nor to meet
the higher academic standards applied to regular decision candidates. The
harm to those students, under Teal, would be enough to trigger disparate
impact analysis.
This argument assumes that admissions standards rise between early and
regular decision for minority and nonminoriy students alike. The Avery study,
however, only provides direct evidence of the rise in standards for nonminority
students. If the standards do not change, then the somewhat academically
weaker students who do not have the wherewithal to apply early can still
compete effectively in regular decision, vis-A-vis other minority students. Thus
the disparate impact claim, though still possible, is not as clear.
If disparate impact does occur and a school is not legally allowed to correct
for ED impact on minority enrollment levels - or if the school decides that the
change is part of the regular fluctuation of admit and yield rateszS-the ED
program will run afoul of Tide VL. 29 Federal regulations allow the government
to withdraw funding from institutions that have policies that
disproportionately affect racial or ethnic groups.13° Thus, if schools maintain
their ED programs, they may risk losing federal funding. '31
Even if there were a bottom line defense for regular-decision corrections, an
attempt to compensate for the shift in class composition in order to comply
with Title VI risks running afoul of Grutter and Gratz. The Supreme Court has
consistently held that an educational institution may not set admissions quotas
for students of color. If ED caused a drop-off, the only way to "make up" for a
decreased number of minority applicants in the ED pool would be to set a
quota or a "plus" factor target, which would violate Gratz. In sum, although
128. Michigan reported that minority students made up anywhere from 13.5% to 20.1% of its
student body between 1993 and 1998. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 336 (2003).
129. 42 U.S.C. 5 20ood (2000).
130. Jennifer C. Braceras, Killing the Messenger: The Misuse of Disparate Impact Theory To
Challenge High-Stakes Educational Tests, 55 VAND. L. REv. 1111, 1119 (2002).
131. Even when a plaintiff can make a showing of disparate impact, a school may still justify the
impact as an "educational necessity." See Bd. of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 151 (1979).
The school must show that any given requirement has a manifest relationship to the
education in question. Id. at 151. If a school justifies a practice as an educational necessity,
the plaintiff may still prevail by showing that an alternative practice would serve the same
purpose without the discriminatory effect. Cf. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
425 (1975) (discussing how a plaintiff overcomes an analogous "business necessity" defense).
Schools seem unlikely to muster effective educational necessity defenses. Indeed, ED does
not appear to be a necessity at all. Most schools functioned for a significant period of time
without ED programs, before adopting them in the 199os.
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the limited data available impedes concrete conclusions, ED programs may well
violate civil rights laws.
IV. EARLY DECISION AND ANTITRUST
Although civil rights is the dominant legal paradigm in educational reform,
antitrust analysis offers a cogent alternative legal critique of ED programs- one
that shifts the focus from race to class and obviates the information problem.
This Part argues that ED violates basic antitrust principles. Section A- through
an analysis of the United States v. Brown University"3 2 price-fixing case- argues
that antitrust principles apply in the higher education context. The following
Sections then evaluate two possible ways that ED violates the Sherman Act:
through market division and information sharing. Finally, Section D considers
possible procompetitive justifications for ED.
A. Antitrust and Higher Education
i. Basic Principles ofAntitrust
The Sherman Act governs "[e]very contract, combination . . . or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States." '
Thus, the "existence of interstate commerce is both a jurisdictional
requirement and an element of the substantive offense."' 4 Supreme Court
precedent suggests that nonprofit status and educational mission do not place
an institution outside the realm of commerce.' The Supreme Court has noted
that "[t] he nature of an occupation, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary
from the Sherman Act . . . nor is the public-service aspect of professional
practice controlling in determining whether § 1 includes professions.
'
,36
Instead, courts must determine if the restraint in question (whether or not by a
nonprofit organization) "is one that promotes competition or one that
suppresses competition."1 3 7 Under Supreme Court precedent, "the most
132. United States v. Brown Univ. (Brown Univ. If), 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
134. United States v. Brown Univ. (Brown Univ. 1), 805 F. Supp. 288, 296 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1992),
rev'd 5 F.3d 658 (3 d Cir. 1993).
135. Id. at 297 n.3 ("It is beyond debate that nonprofit organizations can be held liable under the
antitrust laws." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
136. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975) (citation omitted).
137. Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978).
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fundamental principle of antitrust law" is that a market must be responsive to
consumer preference. ,3
8
The Supreme Court has applied three different forms of analysis to
evaluate whether business arrangements violate the Sherman Act. The first is
the per se rule: Per se violations are those that clearly interfere with market
functions '39 and often directly affect price. The classic example is horizontal
price-fixing between competitors: corporations acting together to raise prices
for products they manufacture, where they control a substantial part of the
interstate trade and commerce in that commodity. 14 Under the per se rule,
"[t]he Act places all such schemes beyond the pale. 1 41 Per se violations rarely
require extensive factual analysis by the court. Arrangements that do not match
the classic contours of a per se violation may be evaluated under a second
standard, known as "quick look" analysis. 42 When applied, a court takes a
"quick look" at the agreement or arrangement at issue. The court determines
whether a more detailed analysis is necessary, or whether the case may be
shunted into the per se category. The third standard of review is under the rule
of reason. 143 The rule of reason evaluates the "reasonableness" of an
arrangement and is highly fact intensive.
2. The Brown University Cases
In 1991, after a two-year investigation of the financial aid programs of
various colleges and universities across the country, the Department of Justice
filed a civil suit against MIT and the eight Ivy League schools.'" Each school
was a member of the "Overlap Group" - twenty-five private colleges and
universities1 4 that had been meeting each spring since 1958 to coordinate
138. Brown Univ. I, 805 F. Supp. at 304.
139. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
140. See, e.g., THOMAS D. MORGAN, MODERN ANTITRUST LAW AND ITS ORIGINS 192-219 (2d ed.
2001).
141. Id. at 221.
142. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 11o (1984) (noting that "the rule of reason can
sometimes be applied in the twinkling of the eye" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
143. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (establishing the rule of reason
test).
144. The suit was filed on May 22, 1991. Michael C. Petronio, Comment, Eliminating the Social
Cost of Higher Education, 83 GEO. L.J. 189, 190 (1994).
145. See United States v. Brown Univ. (Broum Univ. 1), 805 F. Supp. 288, 289-90 (E.D. Pa. 1992)
(listing member institutions), rev'd 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
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financial aid awards .4 6 The Overlap Group allowed the schools to implement
their belief that "any admitted student should have the opportunity to attend
the college of her choice, regardless of her ability to pay. ' Under the Overlap
Agreement, the member schools agreed to three conditions: (1) they would
award aid "solely on the basis of applicants' demonstrated financial need," (2)
they would all use a single method for calculating that need, and (3) they
would equalize financial aid awards to any student admitted to more than one
institution ("overlaps").148
The government charged the schools with "unlawfully conspir[ing] to
restrain trade,"149 a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. '1 0 Specifically, the
government charged that the schools had committed illegal horizontal price-
fixing by collectively determining student aid. All of the defendant schools,
except MIT, entered into a consent decree on the day the government filed
suit; MIT alone went to trial.' s
The district court held that the Overlap Group's actions violated the
Sherman Act. Although MIT argued that the Sherman Act did not apply to the
Overlap Group because the Group's "activities did not constitute trade or
commerce,"152 the district court disagreed and held that educational institutions
were subject to the Act. Turning to the specifics of the Group's behavior, the
court concluded that the members were committing horizontal price-fixing.
5 3
Price-fixing entities need not raise prices for all consumers to a uniform level;
they merely have to tamper with market functions-for instance by colluding
to set different rates for different customers -in order to violate the Sherman
Act.'5 Although horizontal price-fixing is typically a per se violation of the
Sherman Act, the Supreme Court has suggested that the per se rule should not
146. Petronio, supra note 144, at 19o.
147. Srikanth Srinivasan, Note, College Financial Aid and Antitrust: Applying the Sherman Act to
Collaborative Nonprofit Activity, 46 STAN. L. REv. 919, 921 (1994).
148. Brown Univ. I, 805 F. Supp. at 293.
149. Id. at 289.
150. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
1s. Brown Univ. I, 805 F. Supp. at 289.
152. Id. at 296.
153. The classic case establishing the illegality of horizontal price-fixing is United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), which held that an organized effort to raise prices
among major oil companies selling gasoline in the Midwestern United States was illegal
horizontal price-fixing.
154. See Socony-Vacuum Oil, 310 U.S. at 223 (stating that price-fixing occurs when competitors
act in concert with the intent of "raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price
of a commodity").
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apply to certain kinds of horizontal agreements."' s Notably for the educational
context, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar the Court cautioned that "[i] t would
be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other
business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust
concepts which originated in other areas.' 6
In Brown University, the district court heeded the Supreme Court's
admonition to use caution when applying the per se rule outside a purely
business context, but determined that "[n]o reasonable person could conclude
that the Ivy Overlap Agreements did not suppress competition.'1 7 Though the
economic effects of suppressing competition were not clear, the court
ultimately decided that they were irrelevant because "the member institutions
purposefully removed, by agreement, price considerations and price
competition for an Overlap school education." '' The court felt that the
Overlap Group so effectively "denied students the ability to compare prices"
when choosing between the member institutions that it "infringe[d] upon the
most fundamental principle of antitrust law": that all markets should be
responsive to consumer preference." 9 The court rejected all of MIT's proffered
defenses and granted a permanent injunction precluding MIT from
participating in any agreement that affected the price paid by an admitted
student. 6' Both sides appealed.
On appeal, the Third Circuit gave more attention to MIT's alleged
procompetitive justifications for the Overlap Group. MIT argued that,
although the Overlap Group might appear to violate the Sherman Act by
interfering with market function, certain features of the arrangement actually
enhanced competition. MIT proffered several justifications: that the Group
enhanced competition by providing aid and options to needy students who
would not otherwise have been able to attend Overlap schools without limiting
the options of their wealthier peers; that controlling price enhanced
competition between the institutions along other axes, such as curriculum and
campus life options; and finally, that only by coordinating several aspects of
their financial aid programs were the Overlap Group schools able to assure that
155. In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1 (1979), the Court
reasoned that not every agreement that appeared to be horizontal price-fixing was motivated
by the desire to affect the market. Without that motive, the Court held that the arrangement
would not trigger the per se rule. Id. at io.
156. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 n.17 (1975).
157. Brown Univ. 1, 805 F. Supp. at 300-02.
158. Id. at 303.
159. Id. at 304.
16o. Id. at 307.
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students were admitted only on the basis of merit and that the fll financial
needs of admitted students were met. MIT argued that because financial aid
budgets are finite, without Overlap, schools would compete aggressively for
top students through financial aid, to the detriment of their less flashy, but just
as needy, classmates, thereby significantly decreasing the availability of need-
based aid.1
61
The Third Circuit, heeding Goldfarb, keyed on the schools' intent in
forming the Overlap Group. The court noted that the district court failed to
make any findings about the signature economic consequences of illegal
horizontal price-fixing: reduced output or increased price.162 The court gave
the agreement's justifications some consideration, because of MIT's alleged
altruism and claimed "absence of a revenue maximizing purpose." 163 The
burden, however, remained on MIT "to justify price fixing with some
procompetitive virtue, or with a showing of Overlap's reasonable necessity to
its institutional purpose. ' 64 Though the court of appeals, like the district
court, rejected MIT's argument that the agreement enhanced competition in
areas other than price, 65 it was more receptive to MIT's other justifications.
The Third Circuit held that in this specific context, "rather than suppress
competition, Overlap may in fact merely regulate competition in order to
enhance it, while also deriving certain social benefits, ",166 and thus the asserted
i 6. Id. at 304-05.
162. United States v. Brown Univ. (Brown Univ. If), 5 F. 3d 658, 674 (3d Cir. 1993).
163. Id. at 672.
164. Id. at 674.
165. Id. at 675.
166. Id. at 677. Critics have attacked the Third Circuit's Brown University decisions for straying
from Supreme Court antitrust doctrine. See, e.g., Petronio, supra note 144, at 2o8-15;
Srinivasan, supra note 147, at 939 (arguing that antitrust law was incorrectly, and too
harshly, applied in Brown University because the court did not understand the economic
model for nonprofit activity). As noted above, the Supreme Court has traditionally held that
horizontal price-fixing is a per se antitrust violation, and nonprofit activity is not exempt
from that restriction. Indeed, the Court has not been receptive to social-welfare justifications
for different forms of price interference. See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786-88
(1975) (rejecting the bar association's argument that maintaining a price schedule supports
fundamental standards of professional ethics in a "learned profession"). Since Goldfarb, the
Supreme Court has refused to exempt nonprofit associations from Sherman Act regulation.
See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (striking down
maximum fees set by a nonprofit association for medical services). In National Society of
Professional Engineers v. United States, the Supreme Court struck down a professional
association's requirement that engineers and customers not discuss price until the customer
had selected an engineer to work on their project. The Court held that antitrust analysis
under the Sherman Act, which strongly favored competition, did not allow "a defense based
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procompetitive and social-welfare features of the Overlap Agreement required
further analysis. The court emphasized the special nature of education as a
social good that should be widely available. It remanded the case to the district
court so that the court could "more fully investigate the procompetitive and
noneconomic justifications proffered by MIT. '167 On December 22, 1993, MIT
and the Antitrust Division settled the lawsuit on terms similar to the consent
decrees for the other Overlap institutions.1
68
While the suits were pending in Brown University, Congress granted the
Overlap Group schools a two-year grace period. As an interim measure,
Congress approved arrangements among schools in which they agreed upon
general principles for determining student aid in need-blind admissions, while
prohibiting discussion of individual students.'6 9 Congress has renewed the
same or similar versions of the provision several times-most recently in
2001-but the provision will expire in 2008.170 The message is clear: Schools
may cooperate in setting general financial aid methodologies, but the Overlap
Group cannot be revived, and agreements resembling the Overlap Group
violate the Sherman Act.
The following Sections argue that ED, by replicating many of the features
of the Overlap Group, runs afoul of the Sherman Act.
B. Market Division in Higher Education
1. Addyston Pipe: Customer Allocation Defined
Schools' interactions under ED look remarkably like those at issue in Brown
University. Under the Overlap Agreement, school officials met and decided on
financial aid. They then returned to their schools and refused to negotiate
further with admitted students -or, if they did make changes to the student's
on the assumption that competition itself is unreasonable." 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978); see
also Nelson 0. Fitts, Note, A Critique of Noncommercial Justifications for Sherman Act
Violations, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 478 (1999); Petronio, supra note 144; Julie L. Seitz, Comment,
Consideration of Noneconomic Procompetitive justifications in the MIT Antitrust Case, 44 EMORY
L.J. 395, 396 (1995) (concluding that "the appellate court inappropriately remanded the case
to the district court for further consideration of social procompetitive justifications").
167. Brown Univ. II, 5 F.3d at 678.
168. See Theodore Stachtiaris, Note, Antitrust in Need: Undergraduate Financial Aid and United
States v. Brown University, 62 FOpDI-IAM L. REv. 1745, 1745 n.2 (1994).
16g. Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, § 1544, io6 Stat. 448, 837
(expired Sept. 30, 1994).
170. Need-Based Educational Aid Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-72, 115 Stat. 648 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § i note (West 2005)).
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aid packet, they did so only in concert with other Overlap schools. It was direct
horizontal price-fixing. ED takes the form of a different antitrust violation:
customer allocation. 7'
Future Chief Justice William Howard Taft wrote the classic opinion on
customer allocation while he sat on the Sixth Circuit. In United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., '72 six manufacturers of cast-iron pipe agreed among
themselves to divide southern and western markets into regional monopolies
with fixed price systems in each territory.1 7' Taft, writing for the Sixth Circuit,
held that the association was an illegal "combination or conspiracy" in restraint
of trade. 74 On appeal, the Supreme Court largely upheld the ruling,' 7' and
Addyston Pipe remains an important precedent that is routinely cited in
customer-allocation cases. 176
2. Application of Customer Allocation to Early Decision
Under ED, a student only applies to one school and promises to attend if
admitted. In part, the system functions by relying on students to honor their
promises. Colleges and universities, however, have developed an alternate
system of ED enforcement that involves exchanging information in a fashion
similar to the Overlap Agreement, creating a customer-allocation problem.
Schools typically require an ED applicant to sign a statement in which the
student promises not only to attend if admitted, but also to withdraw all
applications pending at other institutions. 77 Although the applicant's promise
m. Customer allocation and horizontal price-fixing are equally violative of the Sherman Act.
The same legal repercussions exist for both types of violations.
172. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
173. Id. at 278-79, 291-93.
174. Id. at 291.
175. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
176. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (holding that a cooperative
supermarket association that restricted members' sales of privately labeled grocery products
was a horizontal restraint on trade and a per se antitrust violation); United States v. Sealy,
Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (holding that respondent company's efforts to allocate mutually
exclusive territories among manufacturer-licensees was a per se antitrust violation). The
Supreme Court has since reaffirmed that customer allocation is a per se violation of the
Sherman Act. See Topco, 405 U.S. at 6o8 (holding that "[o]ne of the classic examples ofaper
se violation of § 1 is an agreement between competitors at the same level of the market
structure to allocate territories in order to minimize competition").
177. Howard Greene & Matthew Greene, Early-Application Papers Require Careful Scrutiny,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Oct. 8, 2003, at F3.
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is not legally enforceable, ,8 ED schools have another way to force students to
adhere to their choices. Once a school admits a student under ED, it notifies
the student, and also sends a list of the students it has admitted ED to all of its
competitor schools. Those schools then check the list and take two steps. First,
they may terminate any EA or regular decision application that an ED-admitted
student has submitted. Second, if they discover that the student has applied
ED to more than one school, they notify the first school - and all involved
typically revoke the student's admission. In short, "colleges practice this form
of reciprocity for self-protection." l 9
In essence, the competitor schools, who-under EA or regular decision-
might have lured the student away with a better financial aid package, promise
not to compete with the school to which the student has been admitted. The
colleges have, through their agreement, created monopolies on certain
customers' business for themselves - an illegal customer allocation and
horizontal restraint of trade. Just as it is illegal to act in combination with
competitors to set different prices for different customers, it is also illegal for
competitors to grant each other exclusive access to certain customers. Each
school, by sending out a list that its competitors will enforce, is guaranteed a
listed student's attendance, and a student can only negotiate financial aid with
the school that admitted him. In the remaining negotiations, the student has
given up his leverage: He cannot make a credible threat to go elsewhere,
because his name has already been removed from other schools' applicant
pools.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that schools use this strong financial aid
position to provide less financial aid than they otherwise would have.s' Some
colleges reduce aid more subtly, by shifting financial aid from grants to
loans. '8 Other anecdotal evidence shows that students who can negotiate may
raise their financial aid offers by thousands of dollars.18 When schools swap
178. AVERY ET AL., supra note 1, at 55.
179. Id.
18o. See id. at 178-79; Alvin P. Sanoff & Jo Ann Tooley, Locking Up Students, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REP., Dec. 23, 1996, at 66, 67. For articles discussing a broader trend toward price
discrimination in determining financial aid, see Peter Passell, The New Economics of Higher
Education: Private Colleges Juggle Aid Formulas To Fill Seats with the Top Freshmen, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 22, 1997, at Di; and Steve Stecklow, Expensive Lessons: Colleges Manipulate
Financial-Aid Offers, Shortchanging Many, WALL ST.J., Apr. 1, 1996, atAi.
181. AVERY ETAL., supra note 1, at 179.
182. See id. at 178 (discussing Carnegie Mellon's negotiations with admitted students); Jenna
Russell, Top Applicants Bargaining for More Aid from Colleges, BOSTON GLOBE, June 12, 2002,
at Al.
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ED lists and enforce them, the ultimate effect on individual ED students looks
much like the results achieved directly through Overlap. For at least a subset of
their admitted students, schools do not have to compete over financial aid.
One important caveat is that schools will generally release an ED student
from her commitment to attend if the student receives "inadequate" financial
aid. Students do not take full advantage of this for two reasons. First, some
students simply are not aware that the option exists, 8 ' and second, others are
not willing to run the risk of losing a sure thing. As the Avery study points out:
Admission offices .. raise the stakes for early admits who seek release
from their commitment for financial reasons. Many schools rescind the
offer of admission when they release an Early Decision admit from the
commitment to enroll. In that case, the student is considered separately
for admission in the regular decision pool. Families that question the
financial aid offer or suspect that they could secure a better deal from
other schools may be hesitant to ask for the commitment to be released
when the price is to reopen the admissions decision.184
By imposing an additional, heavy cost on a student's option to exit, schools can
maintain control of the outcome. Students may decide that the cost of a less
attractive financial aid package does not outweigh the uncertainty of going
through another round of the admissions process. In sum, this ED technique
recreates a fact pattern that concerned the courts in Brown University- using
collusion as a way to limit financial aid outlays. ED should thus trigger
Sherman Act scrutiny.
C. The Information-Sharing Antitrust Model
In addition to the customer-allocation concern discussed in the previous
Section, there is a second reason that ED programs may be illegal under
antitrust law. The Supreme Court has held that information exchange between
competitors may violate the Sherman Act when the effect of the exchange is to
alter or control prices in the vendors' favor. In United States v. Container Corp.
of America, 18 each defendant asked its competitors for information on their
most recent price charged or quoted, whenever it needed the information and
could not find it elsewhere. Each defendant that received such a request usually
183. AVERY ETAL., supra note i, at 116-17.
184. Id. at 57.
185. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
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furnished the data, with the understanding that it too would receive such
information when it sent requests. The information requested, however, was
often available from other sources, such as customers, and the exchanges of
information were infrequent and irregular. 1 6 The Court found, however, that
the "exchange of price information seemed to have the effect of keeping prices
within a fairly narrow ambit," though "at a downward level. '117 The Court
concluded "that the exchange of price information has had an anticompetitive
effect in the industry, chilling the vigor of price competition.' 88 Such
interference with free-market price levels, the Court held, was a per se violation
of the Sherman Act.'89
Because ED involves such extensive information sharing about
"customers," which in turn encourages schools not to compete for one
another's ED applicants, the schools' ED enforcement mechanisms could drive
down the level of financial aid received by a student. In that case, ED would
run afoul of Container Corp.
The Supreme Court's information-sharing cases, however, are not wholly
coherent, and it is unclear which factors the Supreme Court looks to in
determining whether the information sharing is benign, or whether it is cover
for illegal horizontal price-fixing. For example, in Maple Flooring Manufacturers'
Association v. United States,'90 the Court held that trade associations that openly
and fairly gathered and disseminated information about past prices, costs of
the product, stocks of merchandise on hand, and the approximate cost of
shipping did not engage in unlawful restraint of commerce. However, in a
similar case, American Column and Lumber Co. v. United States, the Court held
that vendors' participation in a group plan to disseminate accurate knowledge
of production and market conditions through reports of past transactions,
additional questionnaires inviting estimates, and discussions of future market
conditions violated the Sherman Act.9 In the case of ED, because there is only
one important fact being shared (that a student has been admitted ED) and its
effect on price is fairly clear, the court may see a reason to be concerned about
information sharing, causing ED further antitrust problems.
186. Id. at 335.
187. Id. at 336.
88. Id. at 337.
189. Id.
19o. 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
191. 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
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D. Possible Defenses: Procompetitive Justifications for Early Decision
Notably, the schools that employ ED cannot proffer the same kinds of
procompetitive justifications that the Overlap Group provided in Brown
University. Unlike the Overlap program, ED does not enhance diversity at
universities or the product offered to students. One author has offered an
alternative procompetitive justification of ED. Professor George Priest looked
at a variety of markets that Professor Alvin Roth had described as
"unraveling"'92 and argued that, in fact, the various markets exhibited a fact
pattern in which time had become a form of currency. 93
Roth has studied the phenomenon of "time creep" in several markets, such
as the market for medical interns, rush week for fraternities, and invitations to
play in college bowl games.19 4 In all of the "unraveling" markets, transactions
occur at earlier and earlier time periods; the time creep from the initial date of
transactions to the earlier ones is a form of market failure, in which market
participants make decisions before the time at which the participants could
maximize their available information. In all the markets Roth has studied,
recruiters are competing for high-quality applicants. "Once one recruiter moves
early, the others will have to follow suit, and many may well try to jump still
further ahead. With such a process, the timing of each market moves
inexorably forward." ' Candidates also pressure one another to decide at
earlier times: Waiting a day may mean that all desirable positions are gone if
everyone else acted the day before.
For Roth, optimal matches occur when there is an ordinal preference match
between buyers and sellers -in the case of college admissions, when a first-
choice student matches with his or her first-choice school. According to Roth,
market failure occurs in unraveling markets because parties cannot fully
192. Alvin E. Roth & Xiaolin Xing, Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the
Timing of Market Transactions, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 992, 994 (1994).
193. George L. Priest, Reexamining the Market for Judicial Clerks and Other Assortative Matching
Markets, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 123 (2005) (analyzing the clerkship market from an information-
acquisition standpoint). Applying this logic to ED, applicants -who cannot negotiate the
terms of their education or of their attendance-can use time as a way of registering the
intensity of their preferences for a school. They cannot offer to pay more to attend, but they
can apply at a time that limits their ability to further negotiate financial aid.
194. See, e.g., Alvin E. Roth, The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A
Case Study in Game Theory, 92 J. POL. ECON. 991 (1984); Roth & Xing, supra note 192.
195. AVERYETAL., supra note i, at 265.
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express their optimal ordinal preferences -they are working under conditions
of uncertainty, where time constraints may prevent full information.9
6
Priest, however, has suggested that many of the markets studied by Roth
are ones in which the forms of negotiable currency are limited: For example,
the markets for medical residencies or judicial clerkships are ones in which the
nature of the job, and often the salary, are nonnegotiable. Priest has argued
that in markets like these, where most conditions are nonnegotiable, time itself
becomes a form of currency. 197 Thus, ED converts time into currency, and
allows students to express more fully their preferences in a way that would not
be possible if ED did not exist. Priest's argument does provide a possible
procompetitive justification for ED. While EA might serve a similar purpose,
by allowing students to apply at an earlier time and thus express a strong
preference, ED's binding nature makes it a more accurate indicator of student
preference.
The Avery study's findings do not support this supposition. It shows that
half of the students who applied ED applied strategically- not because they
had a strong preference for the school.198 In contrast, only one-seventh of the
students who applied to schools with EA programs did so for strategic
reasons. 99 The benefits to students under both programs are similar -in both
cases, students receive a significant boost in their application strength by
applying early- so the incentives to apply strategically are roughly the same. At
an EA school, the strategic incentives might even be stronger, because a student
could receive the benefit of applying early without being bound to attend. The
Avery findings suggest that ED is not as accurate a predictor of student
preference as schools might hope.
Beyond the empirical uncertainty of Priest's claim for ED, however, it is not
clear that the suggested market efficiency gains from ED for students outweigh
the losses ED causes to individual students. Students who apply ED benefit in
two ways: first, by being able to express their preferences, and second, if they
are accepted, by finishing the stressful college application process ahead of
their peers. However, ED also disadvantages students by limiting their ability
to negotiate financial aid, and thus denying needier students the ability to take
advantage of an ED option. To the extent that the costs of ED outweigh the
market benefits for students, student consumers suffer. If this happens, ED
violates the Sherman Act.
196. See Roth & Xing, supra note 192.
197. See Priest, supra note 193.
198. AVERYETAL., supra note i, at 207.
199. Id. at 206.
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CONCLUSION
Leaders in higher education continue to discuss ways to improve diversity
in their student bodies. °° One answer is to eliminate ED because it creates
unnecessary roadblocks to both racial and socioeconomic diversity. Colleges
and universities could achieve the legitimate goals that ED serves -identifying
student enthusiasm and stabilizing yield-through at least two other options.
The first would be to adopt Single Choice Early Action (SCEA). SCEA allows a
student to apply early to only one school, though she can later apply to other
schools under regular decision. SCEA allows schools to identify enthusiastic
students but does not limit a student's financial aid negotiations. Schools could
thus legally enforce the single-choice element of SCEA in the same way that
they enforce ED, without running afoul of antitrust law.
SCEA, however, comes with its own possible legal problems. The Avery
study found that minority students apply at similar rates, relative to their white
peers, under EA as they do under ED.2"' Two factors may reduce the number
of minorities in the ED applicant pool. First, minority families may be more
concerned about how they will pay for college than nonminority families, and
may thus be more unwilling to commit to a school without comparing financial
aid packages. Second, minority families may know less about the advantages of
the early application process than nonminority families; indeed, the Avery
study repeatedly stresses this point. If the financial aid concern predominates,
minority students would be more willing to apply EA than ED. The limited
information available to the contrary suggests that, instead, the information
problem predominates; minority families may not know enough about the
intricacies of early admission programs to differentiate between ED and EA. If
that is so, implementing SCEA-while it addresses ED's antitrust problems -
will not resolve the disparate impact issue.
The Avery study suggests another, more promising, option: eliminating
early admission programs altogether, while allowing students to indicate a
single first-choice school through a neutral nationwide clearinghouse. 202 Under
200. Peter Schmidt, College Presidents Urge Changes in Undergraduate Education for Sake of Student
Diversity, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 20, 2005, http://chronicle.com/daily/2ooS/o4/
2005 o4 20oln.htm.
2o1. AVERY ET AL., supra note i, at 59 ("Specifically, 11.9 percent of African Americans and 13.5
percent of Hispanics applied early at Early Action schools, while 20.5 percent of all
applicants to those schools applied early. The pattern is the same at Early Decision schools:
3.6 percent of African Americans and 4.8 percent of Hispanics applied early at ED schools,
while 7.4 percent of all applicants to those schools applied early.").
202. Id. at 289.
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this system, less privileged students would not have to contend with early
admissions' varying deadlines, requirements, and rules. Instead, all students
would apply regular decision and submit the name of their top-choice college
to the clearinghouse. The clearinghouse would, in turn, share the information
with colleges and universities. The model is similar to the College Board's
system for the SATs: Students' scores are on file with the College Board, and
students formally request that the Board release that information to the
colleges and universities to which they are applying. An independent third
party verifying students' choices would prevent students from gaming the
system: Unlike the current system, students could not represent to several
schools that each of the schools is the student's first choice. The Avery study
points out that an "indicated interest" system already exists for well-connected
students. College counselors from top high schools often place calls to
admissions officers to let a school know when a student has a regular-decision
"first choice." The Avery proposal would formalize such a system and make it
available to all studentsY.13 It is an attractive, and legally promising, proposal
because it reduces both the financial concerns raised by antitrust analysis and
the informational ones raised by civil rights law.
Although the educational community has argued intensely about ED's
ethical implications, almost nobody has considered ED's legal implications.
This Note injects legal analysis and structure into the debate. Both civil rights
and antitrust analysis raise significant legal concerns that cannot be ignored.
While ethical arguments for and against ED can only persuade, ED's legal
problems may result in mandated change and thus demand the attention of the
higher education community. The legal concerns also command reform.
Schools have resisted change and dragged their feet, denying that ED causes
any real problems. Basic analysis in two different legal fields advises otherwise.
Though the available information is sometimes vague, even the limited
information available suggests that ED is a problem worthy of more serious
discussion and analysis from both the higher education and legal communities.
203. Id. at 289-91.
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